From August 31 to September 1, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) hosted the 25th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Heads of State Council, which yielded several diplomatic successes for Beijing.
Publicado en The Soufan Center, el 2 de septiembre de 2025
- The SCO Summit showcased the leaders of the PRC, Russia, and India displaying symbolic and strategic unity, with the implicit understanding that this is taking place at the expense of the United States.
- This cautious rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing has primarily been attributed to Trump’s efforts to drive a wedge between Russia and India, yet Washington’s approach has instead soured relations between the U.S. and India.
- Recent public relations successes aside, the SCO as a bloc still faces systemic challenges and competing priorities, including serious geopolitical rivalries that persist between member states.
From August 31 to September 1, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) hosted the 25th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Heads of State Council, which yielded several diplomatic successes for Beijing. The SCO is a PRC-led political, economic, and security multilateral bloc comprising 10 Eurasian states, including Russia, India, and Iran. The SCO as a bloc has grown in membership since its founding in 2001. Still, its effectiveness and clout on the international stage have remained blunted due to a lack of collective action beyond issuing declarations and statements, as well as seemingly competing agendas between and among Member States (like the PRC and India). However, statements, bilateral agreements, and diplomatic wins emerging from the weekend’s gathering in China suggest that Beijing may be taking advantage of the diplomatic blundering of the United States to attempt to remake the current world order in favor of the PRC.
The SCO Summit showcased the leaders of the PRC, Russia, and India displaying symbolic and strategic unity, with the implicit understanding that this is taking place at the expense of the United States. Images of Putin and Modi embracing, Modi and Putin riding together in Putin’s car ahead of their bilateral meeting, and Xi, Putin, and Modi holding hands and engaged in animated and friendly discussions clearly aim to display unity in the face of continued U.S. pressure. The symbolism was also accompanied by statements that should be interpreted as opposing the U.S. world order and economic and trade practices in light of Trump’s tariffs. The joint declaration stated that Member States “oppose unilateral coercive measures, including economic measures…” The declaration also “strongly condemns the military aggression launched by Israel and the United States against Iran in June 2025” (Iran is an SCO member). Xi’s speech called for upholding “the common interests of the Global South,” continuing to oppose “hegemony and power politics” by practicing “multilateralism” and promoting “a multipolar world.” Putin took the opportunity to push the Kremlin’s narrative of the war in Ukraine and tout the SCO as an alternative to Western-led institutions.
Several diplomatic wins were also on display during the SCO Summit, specifically favoring India and the PRC. Perhaps of most consequence is the thaw between the PRC and India, which included Modi’s first visit to China in seven years, a joint statement acknowledging that Beijing and New Delhi are not rivals but development partners, and a discussion on expanding trade and investment. India’s increasing influence in the PRC-led bloc included the adaptation of New Delhi’s civilizational concept “One Earth, One Family, One Future” into the Tianjin declaration as well as the bloc collectively “condemn[ing] the terrorist attack in Pahalgam” that took place earlier this year and led to renewed fighting between India and Pakistan. This cautious rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing has primarily been attributed to U.S. President Trump’s efforts to drive a wedge between Russia and India; however, the economic policies seem to have instead soured relations between the U.S. and India. It presents broader challenges to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific and could undermine efforts to bring India into U.S.-led efforts to counter the PRC’s influence in the region.
While the PRC-India and PRC-Russia relationships were center stage at the SCO Summit, other diplomatic wins took place that could further cement the PRC’s ambitions of being a “responsible global player.” On the sidelines of the SCO Summit, Armenia and Pakistan signed a Joint Communique to establish formal diplomatic relations. Pakistan refused to recognize Armenia’s independence after the fall of the Soviet Union and continuously sided with Azerbaijan diplomatically and militarily. While the Trump administration hailed its diplomatic clout in early August with the U.S.-brokered peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Armenia and Pakistan could suggest that the SCO may become a mechanism for regional reconciliation, facilitated by Beijing. Armenia applied to become a full member of the SCO in July this year.
Beijing emerged as the clear winner of the SCO Summit, particularly in relation to Washington in the ongoing strategic competition. Apart from the diplomatic wins and strategic symbolism of unity against the United States, Xi also pushed for practical institutionalizations within the SCO that further the PRC’s global agenda. Xi proposed new financial tools (the SCO development bank), which is a step toward circumventing the U.S. dollar and sanctions. Xi also pushed for greater science and technology cooperation among SCO members, including establishing access to the BeiDou satellite network, inviting SCO members to participate in China’s lunar research station, and the PRC building an artificial intelligence cooperation center.
Still, it remains challenging to determine whether China’s success at the SCO Summit stems from its own strategic acumen or is merely a byproduct of diplomatic missteps by the United States. It is likely a combination of the two. Indeed, the SCO as a bloc still suffers from systemic challenges and competing priorities. For example, serious geopolitical rivalries remain between member states, such as India and Pakistan. Many of the SCO member states continue to view the PRC’s growing influence and ambition on the Eurasian continent with hesitation, and major irritants remain. In the India-PRC relationship, the trade deficit between the two countries (in the PRC’s favor), the planned mega-dam in Tibet that could threaten India’s water security, and Beijing’s support for Pakistan are unresolved. Lastly, unlike other international blocs, such as the European Union, the SCO remains primarily symbolic and rhetorical, although this could change in the future. It remains to be seen how the PRC will continue to leverage U.S. isolationism to advance its multilateral agenda through the SCO and other mechanisms.