The upcoming Putin-Trump meeting in Alaska on Friday, which will discuss a Ukraine settlement, is likely to reaffirm Russia’s willingness to calibrate the implementation of its strategic partnership with Tehran to serve Moscow’s priority objectives in Ukraine.
Publicado en The Soufan Center, el 12 de agosto de 2025.
- Iranian leaders appear to have miscalculated that providing Moscow with armed drones and ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine would leverage unconditional Russian support for Tehran
- Putin has adopted Washington’s position that Iran should accede to a new nuclear accord that precludes Iran from enriching uranium (“zero enrichment”).
- Russia appears willing to help Iran rebuild its shattered air defense network, but Russia’s S-400 advanced air defense system, if supplied to Iran, also presents a ripe target for future Israel and/or U.S. strikes on Iran.
As U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin prepare to meet on Friday in Alaska to discuss a Ukraine war settlement, Russia’s relationship with Iran might feature as one of several additional issues considered in the meeting. The Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure in June prompted Iranian leaders to try to leverage their strategic partnership with Russia to deter further attacks on Iranian territory and resist U.S. efforts to compel Tehran to dismantle its nuclear program entirely. However, Putin has demonstrated that he views the partnership agreement with Iran, which covers defense, counterterrorism, energy, finance, and culture, as a transaction that could be implemented – or ignored – according to Russia’s immediate needs and circumstances. Offering to downplay or limit implementation of the Russia-Iran partnership in Alaska is a useful tool to help Putin achieve his broader Ukraine war goals and avoid additional Ukraine-related U.S.-led sanctions.
Iranian leaders assessed that signing a 20-year, 47-article strategic partnership agreement with Russia in January would assure Tehran of Moscow’s support in a broad array of potential scenarios. Russia and Iran have been aligned in trying to weaken what they both view as U.S. global hegemony, and the formal partnership agreement was widely considered an additional “reward” for Iran’s decision to supply Moscow with the lethal Shahed drones, and reportedly short-range ballistic missiles, that Russian forces have been using to significant effect against Ukraine. Iran’s Majles (parliament) ratified the partnership treaty on May 21, and the Guardian Council, a body that vets legislation, gave its final approval on June 11 – two days before Israel began its bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities, technicians, and security commanders.
Iranian calculations that its partnership with Moscow might help deter Israel or the U.S. from militarily attacking Iranian territory were shattered when Israel began its “Operation Rising Lion” on June 13, and the U.S. supported the action with Operation Midnight Hammer against three main Iranian nuclear sites on June 22. Russia’s reaction to the strikes, including at an emergency UN Security Council session on Iran, was limited mainly to open but rhetorical criticism of the bombing as aggression. Putin denounced the U.S. and Israeli strikes as «baseless and unjustified.” Reflecting Russia’s emphasis on its relationship with the Trump foreign policy team, and not on materially supporting its Iranian partner, Putin proposed to President Trump that Moscow mediate the Israel-Iran conflict. Trump told reporters on June 18 he had rebuffed the offer, saying: «I spoke to [Putin] yesterday and… he actually offered to help mediate, I said ‘do me a favor, mediate your own. Let’s mediate Russia first, okay? You can worry about this later.’» During the course of its bombing campaign, Israel destroyed remaining elements of Iran’s air defense network, the core of which – Russian-supplied S-300 system – had been disabled by Israeli retaliatory air strikes in October 2024. There are no indications that Moscow, which requires its available air defense for use against Ukraine, has attempted to resupply Tehran or help it defend its airspace before or during the Israeli campaign or U.S. Operation Midnight Hammer.
Even though Iran’s expectations of Russian support were not met, Iranian leaders nonetheless sought Moscow’s support in the aftermath of the war, in an effort to restore a measure of deterrence. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow immediately after President Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran and met with Putin and other Russian leaders. Putin described the visit as a «pivotal moment» for the region, lauded the historic and deeply entrenched ties between Iran and Russia, and noted the evolution of their cooperation into a strategic alliance. Araghchi thanked Russia for condemning the U.S. and Israeli attacks, adding that Russia was «on the right side of history and international law.» Araghchi also acknowledged Russia’s crucial role in past Iran nuclear negotiations, including as a party to the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA), which Trump abrogated in 2018 during his first term.
Yet, aside from expressions of support, Tehran has received little of substance from Putin in the aftermath of the U.S. and Israeli bombing. Putin and his aides have made it clear that they attach more weight to their relations with the Trump team – and in particular, forestalling expanded U.S. sanctions on Russia – than to upholding pledges to Tehran. In mid-July, Russia’s view of its relationship with Tehran was clarified by Putin’s reported comments to Trump, in which he expressed support for the idea of a nuclear deal that would prevent Iran from enriching uranium (“zero enrichment”), according to Axios media. Advocating zero enrichment firmly aligns Putin with Trump and U.S. allies in Europe, who all want to ensure Iran’s nuclear program is dismantled without any further Israeli or U.S. military action. Putin’s positioning represents a clear shift from Russia’s earlier positions – taken in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s supply of drones for Russia’s war effort – in which Moscow publicly advocated for Iran’s “right to enrich” uranium. Tehran says it reserves the right to enrich uranium as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Instead, in the interests of obtaining favorable terms in a Ukraine settlement, Russia has shifted back to its historic position of working with the U.S and other powers to ensure Iran does not become a nuclear-armed state.
European and Israeli officials with knowledge of the issue assert Moscow has delivered the same message to Tehran in private that it has announced publicly. Putin expressed that position in July calls with Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron. A senior Israeli official told journalists the Russians also briefed the Israeli government about Putin’s support for a zero enrichment agreement, saying: “We know that this is what Putin told the Iranians.» However, despite Putin’s pressure to accede to Trump’s conditions, Iranian officials insist they will not consider accepting zero enrichment, and no talks with the Trump team are now scheduled.
Aside from long-term strategic considerations, Russia also has a financial interest in supporting Trump’s demand for an end to enrichment on Iranian territory. Russian officials have made clear in public and private that if a U.S.-Iran zero enrichment deal is reached, Russia is willing to remove Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium for reprocessing. Additionally, Moscow has signaled it would supply Iran with the 3.67 percent enriched uranium for nuclear power and small quantities of 20 percent enriched uranium for the Tehran research reactor and the production of nuclear isotopes. The Russian offer adds weight to U.S. arguments that Iran does not need to enrich uranium on its own territory in order to fuel its nuclear power industry. Russia is also helping Iran finish construction of another nuclear power plant (Bushehr 2), including the existing plant at Bushehr (Bushehr 1) that Russia built, and is in talks to build a further two Iranian reactors. Russia earned nearly $2 billion for constructing the first two reactors. Russia received $300 million for a 10-year fuel supply for Bushehr 1. Putin has also reportedly indicated to Trump that Russia sought assurances from Israeli leaders that its nuclear work in Iran, including its 200 technicians in the country, will not come under threat from Israeli air operations.
Yet, Russia is offering Tehran just enough reassurances to keep the strategic partnership intact. In late July, defense sources reported, subject to confirmation, that Iran conducted its first live test of the highly sophisticated, Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defense system. The system, purportedly tested near the major city of Isfahan, which was also the site of one of the major nuclear sites struck by Operation Midnight Hammer, can detect and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles from hundreds of kilometers away. The test was interpreted as a clear warning to Israel and the U.S. that Iran will defend its airspace. A Russian transfer of the S-400 to Iran, if confirmed, would send a message to Tehran that Moscow values and will fully abide by its strategic partnership with Iran, even as it pressures Iranian leaders to accept Trump’s nuclear demands. However, the S-400 would represent a potential threat to Israel and U.S. aircraft in the event of future strikes being ordered, and Israel will likely evaluate ways – using operatives on the ground or possibly more air strikes – to disable it.